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What options are available to Scotland to remain within the EU given the µBrexit¶ 
referendum result? 
Maria Fletcher  (University of Glasgow) and Rebecca Zahn (University of Strathclyde) 
The 23 June 2016 referendum result has the potential to impact hugely RQ 6FRWODQG¶V
relationship with the European Union and indeed with the rest of the UK. Within the 
framework of the current devolved settlement in the UK, withdrawal from the EU by the UK 
IROORZLQJDFWLYDWLRQRI WKH(8¶V µH[LWFODXVH¶ZLOOPHDQ WKDW6FRWOand also leaves the UK, 
GHVSLWHDVLJQLILFDQWPDMRULW\RIWKH6FRWWLVKHOHFWRUDWHYRWLQJWRµUHPDLQ¶,QOHJDOWHUPVWKH
United Kingdom as a state recognised under international law, is the signatory to the 
European Treaties. Withdrawal of that state, includes its constituent parts. 
Independence 
The referendum result which saw an overall UK vote to Leave the European Union but a 
62/38% vote in favour of Remain in Scotland, has prompted calls from the First Minister of 
6FRWODQG WR µWDNH DOO SRVVLEOH VWHSV and explore all options to give effect to how people in 
6FRWODQG YRWHG¶1 One of these options is a second independence referendum in Scotland, 
which the First Minister, described in the immediate aftermath of the 23 June vote, DVµKLJKO\
OLNHO\¶ LQ WKH QHxt two-and-a-KDOI \HDUV IROORZLQJ WKH 8.¶V YRWH WR OHDYH WKH (8 6KRXOG
Scotland democratically secede from the UK it would then be in a position to be a member of 
the EU in its own right. An independent Scotland would be the clearest legal route to 
membership of the EU should the UK leave.  The clearest, but by no means guaranteed, let 
alone quick and easy. As with the first independence referendum, an agreement would need 
to be reached between Holyrood and Westminster to provide the necessary legislative 
competence for this to take place, and negotiations required with the EU in order to reorder 
6FRWODQG¶V UHODWLRQVKLS WKHUHZLWK $VVXPLQJ WKLV FRXOG DFKLHYHG WKH SDUWLFXODU EU legal 
route (Article 48 or 49 TEU) to such membership for Scotland is also contested]. the 
traditional accession route for any non-EU State (Article 49 TEU) would place Scotland 
alongside a number of other States in that particular queue and down a route of full EU-
acquis adoption, thus relinquishing the current UK-negotiated scenario of opt-outs from the 
euro and Schengen for instance. Alternatively Article 48 TEU provides for the Treaties to be 
amended by unanimous consent of the Member States and is sometimes referred to as a basis 
IRU DOORZLQJ µLQWHUQDO HQODUJHPHQW¶ Assuming there is the political will to use Article 48 
TEU and assuming matters of timing permit, there could be a seemless transition from 
6FRWODQG¶V PHPEHUVKLS RI WKH (8 DV SDUW RI WKH 8. DQG LWV PHPEHUVKLS RI WKH (8 DV DQ
independent State on Brexit day.2  
Could Scotland remain in the EU without seeking independence? 
A second and parallel on-going discussion to the Scottish independence route to EU 
membership is whether Scotland could remain in the EU without seeking independence.  
                                                          
1 http://stv.tv/news/politics/1358534-nicola-sturgeon-speech-in-full-after-eu-referendum-result/ 
2
 For a helpful summary of the Article 48 and 49 TEU issue in relation to Scotland see 
http://verfassungsblog.de/a-european-future-for-scotland/ 
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Could England and WaleV HIIHFWLYHO\ ZLWKGUDZ WKHLUPHPEHUVKLSRI WKH(8DQG WKH8.¶V
membership somehow be retained through a relationship with Scotland (and Northern 
Ireland)?  Certainly, this would require a high level of political will and legal creativity at 
both the UK and the EU level. It is instructive to study and learn from existing examples of 
WKH (8¶V considerable flexibility - where it has accommodated differential territorial 
application of EU law within a Member State3 ± EXW WKHUH LV QR µRII WKHSHJ¶ DUUDQJHPHQW
which would allow Scotland to both remain in the EU while also remaining part of the UK.  
A number of precedents have been cited where different parts of a Member State have 
different relationships with the EU. Examples include Greenland, the Channel Islands and the 
Isle of Man, and Cyprus. Indeed, territorial differentiation ± where different parts of EU law 
apply to different parts of a Member State  - is not uncommon.4 However, they differ from 
the Scottish example in that in all of these cases the metropolitan State participates fully in 
the EU. In addition, the only historical example where part of a territory of a Member State 
has left the EU while the rest of a Member State has remained an EU member can be found in 
Denmark/Greenland. In 1985 Greenland, constitutionally a part of Denmark, chose to leave 
the EU and became the only country ever to do so. So in essence, part of Denmark is outside 
the EU and part of it remains in the EU.5  This has led some commentators to consider 
ZKHWKHUDµ5HYHUVH*UHHQODQG¶PRGHOFRXOGEHXVHGWRDOORZ6FRWODQGDQG1RUWKHUQ,UHODQG
to remain within the EU without seceding from the UK.6 In theory, this may be legally 
possible with the requisite consent of the UK and EU parties7, but the UK situation is 
materially different from the Danish situation and the legal and political obstacles to such a 
solution are considerable. 
Greenland represents 1% of the overall population of Denmark and is geographically isolated 
from it and Europe. Greenland is for almost all internal affairs a self-governing country, with 
Danish responsibility limited essentially to foreign affairs, monetary policy, citizenship and 
defence.  A tiny, distant and highly autonomous part of Denmark therefore sought to leave 
the EU. In the case of Scotland a small (8%), geographically attached and (relatively) less 
autonomous part of the UK would seek to remain in the EU while the bulk of the UK would 
                                                          
3 We need not look any further than our shores to know that different state configurations are possible and that 
the EU does and can accommodate differential participation (eg. Gibraltar). In fact the UK is one of six Member 
States with territories holding certain special statuses in EU law. Overseas countries and territories (OCTs) are a 
distinct grouping in the EU and have their own agreements (for which provision is made in Articles 198-204 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)) which regulate their relationships with the EU. 
4 See more broadly D Kochenov (ed), On Bits of Europe Everywhere. Overseas Possessions of the EU Member 
States in the Legal-Political Context of European Law (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2011). For an 
overview of the usefulness of this concept in the Scottish case see N. Skoutaris, From Britain and Ireland to 
&\SUXV$FFRPPRGDWLQJµ'LYLGHG,VODQGV¶LQWKH(83ROLWLFDl and Legal Order, EUI Working Paper AEL 
2016/02 
5
 The Greenland Treaty LQWURGXFHGDFODXVHLQWRWKH((&DQG(XUDWRP7UHDWLHVVWDWLQJWKDWµWKLV7UHDW\VKDOOQRW
apSO\WR*UHHQODQG¶DQGDGGHG*UHHQODQGDVRQHRIWKHRYHUVHDVWHUULWRULHVRIWKH0HPEHU6WDWHVLQZKDWLVQRZ
Annex II to the Treaties. 
6 See for instance http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2016/07/07/reverse-greenland-arrangement/ DQG7/RFNµ$
(XURSHDQ)XWXUHIRU6FRWODQG"¶DYDLODEOHDWYHUIDVVXQJVEORJGHD-european-future-for-scotland/; 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/uk/adam-ramsay/reverse-greenland-letting-scotland-stay    
7  )RUWKHDUJXPHQWWKDWWKHµZLWKGUDZDO¶RIIRULQVWDnce) England and Wales from the EU might be legally 
attainable by changing the provision on the territorial application of the EU Treaties rather than activating 
Article 50 TEU see https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/06/30/leonard-besselink-beyond-notification-how-to-
leave-the-european-union-without-using-article-50-teu/ 
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be outside of it.  Moreover, some of the many practical problems created by such a scenario 
include the required adjustment to the current division of competences between Holyrood and 
Westminster  (at least) to enable Scotland to engage in external relations and those associated 
with the creation of an internal border within the UK for goods and persons.8  
7KH H[DPSOH RI &\SUXV¶V UHODWLRQVKLS ZLWK WKH (8 PD\ EH LQVWUXFWLYH LQ WKLV UHJDUG $V
6NRXWDULVSRLQWVRXWµ&\SUXVLVWKHRQO\0HPEHU6WDWHZKHUHWKHacquis does not apply to a 
significant part of its territory and there is a territorial border between the part where it 
DSSOLHV DQG ZKHUH LW GRHV QRW¶9 7KH DSSOLFDWLRQ RI WKH (8¶V DFTXLV LV VXVSHQGHG LQ WKH
northern part of Cyprus, which is effectively controlled by Turkey (Protocol No 10 of the 
Treaty of Accession 2003). As long as that suspension is not withdrawn Article 2 of the 
Protocol allows the Council to define the terms under which the provisions of EU law apply 
WRWKHµ*UHHQ/LQH¶LHWKHGHIDFWRµWHUULWRULDOERUGHU¶. The so called Green Line Regulation10 
regulates the free crossing of people and goods between an area of a Member State where the 
free movement acquis applies and is within the customs union and one where the free 
movement acquis does not apply and is outside the customs union.11 Should a similar 
approach be adopted in the UK context ± to enable the application of EU law to be suspended 
in England and Wales and only continue to apply to Scotland and Northern Ireland, similar 
difficult practical issues relating to the creation of an internal border for goods and persons 
would need to be face and resolved. hard customs border and border checks within the 
territory of the UK. Beyond this, significant constitutional amendment to the devolution 
arrangement would have to take place in order for both regions to take part effectively in the 
political and constitutional life of the EU. And last, but by no means least, the UK 
Government would need to consent to not formally withdrawing from the EU ± and that 
particular ship appears to have sailed.12 
A final option may be to consider to what extent Scotland could continue to benefit from EU 
ODZVLQWKHHYHQWRIWKH8.¶VDQGWKHUHIRUH6FRWODQG¶VZLWKGUDZDOIURPWKH(8 
+RZFRXOG6FRWODQGFRQWLQXHWREHQHILWIURP(8ODZVLQWKHHYHQWRIWKH8.¶VZLWKGUDZDO
from the EU? 
The extent to which Scotland could continue to benefit from EU laws in the event of the 
8.¶V ZLWKGUDZDO IURP WKH (8 GHSHQGV RQ WKH IXWXUH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ WKH (8 DQG WKH
UK. Potential options include (continued) membership of the European Economic Area 
(EEA) and/or the European Free Trade Association (EFTA); a series of bilateral deals with 
                                                          
8
 FLWH$LOHHQ0F+DUJ¶VOLVWRITXHULHVLQHDUOLHU(G/DZ5HYLHZSLHFH 
9 N. Skoutaris, )URP%ULWDLQDQG,UHODQGWR&\SUXV$FFRPPRGDWLQJµ'LYLGHG,VODQGV¶LQWKH(83ROLWLFDODQG
Legal Order, EUI Working Paper AEL 2016/02, p. 9. 
10
 Council Regulation (EC) No 866/2004 of 29 April 2004. 16NRXWDULVµ7KHDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKHDFTXLV
communautaire in the areas not under the effective control of the Republic of Cyprus: The Green Line 
5HJXODWLRQ¶45 Common Market Law Review (2008) 727. 
11
 N.Skoutaris, ibid. n. 8 
12
 µ%UH[LW$UWLFOHZLOOEHWULJJHUHGE\HQGRI0DUFK7KHUHVD0D\¶VHH
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/article-50-theresa-may-march-2017-brexit-a7341236.html 
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the EU; or D µKDUG¶ %UH[LW ZKHUHE\ WKH 8.¶V UHODWLRQVKLS ZLWK WKH (8 LV JRYHUQHG E\ WKH
:RUOG7UDGH2UJDQLVDWLRQ¶VUXOHV.13 
In any case, a transition period after the UK exits the EU is likely GXULQJZKLFK WKH8.¶V
rights and obligations as an EU Member State are phased out.14 EU law may therefore 
continue to apply to pending disputes which began before UK withdrawal from the EU. In 
addition, UK common law may, in some areas such as employment law, lead to the 
continuing application of some standards of EU law. In the area of employment law, judges 
have shown themselves as remarkably adept at recognising not only economic and social 
conditions but also legal constructs which are prejudicial to workers, and have expanded the 
common law when necessary. Judges may well therefore find ways to uphold those rights 
derived from EU law which have become part of UK law following Brexit.15  
The outcome of the negotiations over Brexit is, for obvious reasons, difficult to predict. 
Should the UK negotiate (continued) membership of the EEA then access to the single 
market is secured and most current and future EU laws on free movement of goods, services, 
people and capital would continue to apply to the UK and, therefore by extension, to 
Scotland. Certain safeguard clauses in the EEA agreement might be sufficient to satisfy a 
desire for control over immigration16 and significant policy matters such as agriculture, 
fisheries, tax and non-EU trade are not within the scope of the EEA, possibly making it a 
more attractive option (even if on an interim basis) for the UK and Scotland. Finally, the case 
law of the EFTA Court and relevant case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
would apply.  
The UK could also negotiate a series of bilateral agreements governing its future relations 
with the EU, akin to the EU-Switzerland relationship. Switzerland has signed over one 
hundred bilateral treaties with the EU enabling it to participate in different EU policies or 
programmes.17 In addition, Switzerland is a member of EFTA which provides for free trade 
with the EU in all non-agricultural goods. In those areas covered by bilateral treaties, 
Switzerland has committed to observing significant amounts of EU law.18 As a result, the EU 
                                                          
13 For a more detailed overview see Chalmers, Davies and Monti µ7KH$XWKRULW\RI(8/DZEH\RQGWKH8QLRQ¶ 
14 Chalmers and Menon advocate for a speedy exit followed by a lengthy transition phase during which the 
terms of the future relationship are negotiated. They anticipate a closer relationship for Scotland (and possibly 
Northern Ireland) with the EU than other parts of the UK, which might involve Scotland keeping EU law in 
place in return for informal participation in the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), the body 
of civil servants which prepare Council of Ministers meeting. See http://openeurope.org.uk/intelligence/britain-
and-the-eu/3-step-brexit-solution/ 
15 http://blog.oup.com/2016/06/filling-void-brexit-employment-law/  
16 See for a comprehensive and positive account of the EEA option - http://www.adamsmith.org/evolution-not-
revolution. However, the safeguard clause can only be invoked according to strict criteria (If serious economic, 
societal or environmental difficulties of a sectorial or regional nature liable to persist are arising) and EU States 
could retaliate by imposing limits on the free movement of goods or services. For more information see: 
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2016/06/what-next-after-uk-vote-to-leave-eu.html.  
17 See fuUWKHU6/DYHQH[µ6ZLW]HUODQG¶V)OH[LEOH,QWHJUDWLRQLQWKH(8$&RQFHSWXDO)UDPHZRUN¶
Swiss Political Science Review 547. 
18 6HHIXUWKHU56FKZRNµ6ZLW]HUODQG¶V$SSUR[LPDWLRQRILWV/HJLVODWLRQWRWKH(8$FTXLV6SHFLILFLWLHV
/HVVRQVDQG3DUDGR[HV¶European Journal of Law Reform 447. Swiss authorities have also adopted the 
SROLF\RIDXWRQRPRXVDGRSWLRQµDXWRQRPHU1DFKYROO]XJ¶RI(8ODZVZKLFKPHDQVWKDW(8ODZVKDYHD
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has closer ties with Switzerland than with any other non-EEA country. However, this 
relationship is not unproblematic19, particularly in the wake of a Swiss referendum in 
February 2014 which voted, in breach of Swiss obligations on Schengen, to impose quotas on 
the number of EU citizens who could reside in Switzerland.20 The EU has responded by 
stating its intention to withdraw from any negotiations on the internal market if the principles 
of non-discrimination, freedom of establishment and right to reside are not respected. 
At the time of writing, it is unclear what is the desired future relationship  between the UK 
and the EU. The British Prime Minister has however announced that the Government plans to 
WULJJHUWKH$UWLFOHZLWKGUDZDOSURFHVVE\WKHHQGRI0DUFKDQGWKDWWKHQH[W4XHHQ¶V
6SHHFK ZLOO LQFOXGH D ³*UHDW 5HSHDO %LOO´ ZKRVH SULPDU\ REMHFWLYH ZLOO EH WR UHSHDO WKH
European Communities Act 1972 (ECA) - which is the statute giving domestic effect to EU 
law in the UK - on Brexit day.21 As dramatic as the latter may sound, it is legally 
uncontroversial: if the UK leaves the EU, then it no longer needs to give effect to EU law. 
But disentanglement of EU law from the devolved nations would also require amendment of 
the relevant parts of the devolved legislation and, given the different voting patterns and 
political and constitutional dynamics in Scotland and Northern Ireland, this may be far more 
controversial.22 As to the massive amount of EU-inspired law in the UK, the UK government 
is likely to embark on a lengthy review exercise, with  a view to deciding whether to repeal, 
adjust or preserve existing EU-derived laws and whether to follow EU regulation in the 
future.23 A UK government would be free to apply- in the sense of mirroring in UK law and 
practice -  any future EU laws where it agrees on its content.24 In those areas that are 
devolved to Scotland under the Scotland Act, the same rationale applies to the Scottish 
Government and, in fact, in areas such as agriculture, fisheries, environment policy, criminal 
justice and higher education EU competences to legislate will revert to the Scottish 
Parliament and not to Westminster. In these areas, the Scottish Government would be free to 
retain already incorporated EU law and mirror it in future legislation. Although the majority 
of legal opinion suggests that Scotland cannot do anything legally to prevent Brexit as such25, 
it could be that the refusal of legislative consent to the unpicking of EU law (through the 
varying of competence of the devolved institutions and legislation in devolved policy areas) 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
substantial effect on Swiss law. 6HHIXUWKHU6-HQQLµ'LUHNWHXQGLQGLUHNWH(XURSlLVLHUXQJGHUVFKZHL]HULVFKHQ
%XQGHVJHVHW]JHEXQJ¶Leges  489. 
19 See House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, The Future of the European Union: UK Government 
Policy (SO, London, 1st Report 2013-14), para 159. 
20 European Commission, EU-Swiss Relations, Press Release of 10 February 2014. 
21 https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2016/10/02/theresa-mays-great-repeal-bill-some-preliminary-thoughts/ 
22https://constitution-unit.com/2016/06/13/removing-references-to-eu-law-from-the-devolution-legislation-
would-invoke-the-sewel-convention/ 
 
23 However, academics have also explored the (large) extent to which EU law permeates US laws. See further A. 
%UDGIRUGµ7KH%UXVVHOV(IIHFW¶Northwestern University Law Review DQG-6FRWWµ)URP%UXVVHOV
witK/RYH7KH7UDQVDWODQWLF7UDYHOVRI(XURSHDQ/DZDQGWKH&KHPLVWU\RI5HJXODWRU\$WWUDFWLRQ¶
American Journal of Comparative Law 897. 
24 6HH$/D]RZVNLµ:LWKGUDZDOIURPWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQDQG$OWHUQDWLYHVWR0HPEHUVKLS¶EL Rev. 
523 anG+RXVHRI&RPPRQVµ/HDYLQJWKH(8¶5HVHDUFK3DSHU62/RQGRQ 
25 https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2016/06/26/brexit-can-scotland-block-brexit/ 
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would preserve some of the status quo.26   As part of the Brexit negotiations, it may well be in 
the Scottish GovHUQPHQW¶VLQWHUHVWWRSXVKIRUIXUWKHUGHYROXWLRQRIOHJLVODWLYHFRPSHWHQFHLQ
those policy areas which are currently reserved matters and subject to EU competence where 
the Scottish Government wishes to abide by EU norms. Throughout all of this, steering a 
course that averts major constitutional crisis will be tricky. 
CONCLUSION 
7KHUHVD0D\¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRUHDFKLQJD³8.DSSURDFKDQGREMHFWLYHV´27 prior to triggering 
Article 50 TEU and for negotiations with the EU is a welcome political aspiration in the 
absence of any legal obligation (in UK or EU law) to involve the devolved administrations in 
the process of withdrawal from the EU. Assuming the UK Government does trigger the 
Article 50 TEU exit process,28 negotiations between the UK and the EU will begin apace, and 
run for, probably, at least two years. Designing and implementing a democratic deliberation 
process that facilitates a high degree of consent and coordination between the UK 
government, the UK parliament and all of the devolved authorities would seem to be 
imperative given the magnitude of the constitutional change occasioned by Brexit. Formal 
roles for these constitutional stakeholders will be crucial in order to minimise constitutional 
clashes and fragmentation but also in order to design a future relationship with the EU that 
JHQXLQHO\UHIOHFWVWKHSRVLWLRQVDQGDVSLUDWLRQVRIDOODFWRUVLQWKH8.¶VGHYROYHGVHWWOHPHQW
afterall they have a significant role to play in the implementation of the outcome, whatever it 
might be.  
 
  
                                                          
26 This is particularly relevant in the area of free movement of EU citizens where the Scottish government and 
parliament have adopted a more principled stance than the Westminster government. See further 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jul/05/nicola-sturgeon-acts-to-reassure-eu-nationals-scotland and 
http://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/nicola-sturgeon-scotland-needs-free-movement-of-people-1-4185479.  
27
 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-theresa-may-article-50-activated-uk-approach-eu-
referendum-scotland-sturgeon-a7138971.html 
28 Note that there are pending court cases on the matter of who should trigger Article 50 TEU. The core legal 
DUJXPHQWLVZKHWKHUWKH8.JRYHUQPHQWFDQGRWKLVE\µ5R\DO3UHURJDWLYH¶ZKLFKJLYHVWKH8.H[HFXWLYHWKH
power to negotiate treaties and conduct foreign relations, or whether Parliamentary approval is first required. 
